Race, Genetic Variation, and the Haplotype Mapping Project by Ossorio, Pilar N.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 66 | Number 5
Special Issue
Symposium: Proceedings of "The Genomics Revolution?
Science, Law and Policy"
Race, Genetic Variation, and the Haplotype
Mapping Project
Pilar N. Ossorio
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Pilar N. Ossorio, Race, Genetic Variation, and the Haplotype Mapping Project, 66 La. L. Rev. (2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol66/iss5/13
Race, Genetic Variation, and the Haplotype Mapping
Project
Pilar N. Ossorio*
We have heard an overview of the Haplotype Mapping Project
("HapMap Project") and about the Project's sampling strategy.
During its first phase, the Project will collect and analyze samples
from 270 people.' One group from whom samples will be
collected is the Yoruba people living in Nigeria. The Yoruba are
members of a tribal and language group. The Project will also
collect samples from Han people in China. The Han are one of
fifty-four ethnic groups recognized by the Chinese government.
2
Additional samples from Chinese immigrants in Denver, Colorado
(U.S.), may also be included. Another set of samples will be
collected from Japanese people who live in and around Tokyo.
Researchers believe that individuals from many regions of Japan
will be included in this sampling. Finally, researchers will study
samples collected from Mormons who live in Utah (U.S.), and
whose biological samples were already in a repository at the
Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH).
Organizers plan a second phase for the Project, during which
they intend to sample several additional populations. These will
likely include: a group from Kenya; another as yet undefined
African group; Mexican-Americans in California; Asian-Indians in
Texas (an immigrant community primarily from Gujarat, India);
African-Americans in Oakland, California; Italians, probably in
Italy; Finnish people, probably in Finland; and perhaps Moroccans.
• Copyright 2005, by Louisiana Law Review
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1. The International HapMap Consortium, The International Hapmap
Project, Nature, Dec. 18, 2003, at 789; Vivian 0. Wang & S. Sue, In the Eye of
the Storm: Race and Genomics in Research and Practice, American
Psychologist, Jan. 2005, at 37.
2. Vivian 0. Wang, The Potential Impact of Haplotype Mappin on Public
Policy: The Genomics Revolution?, Science, Law & Policy, Feb. 4-6, 2004.
3. The Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH) is a research
laboratory created in 1984 by Professor Jean Dausset (Nobel Prize, medicine
and physiology, 1980). This laboratory constructs maps of the human genome.
The original idea of Professor Dausset was to provide the scientific community
with resources for the human genome mapping. See Fondation Jean Dauset,
More About the Fondation Jean Dausset - CEPH, http://www.cephb.fr
/ceph_presentation.html.
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Work with some of these groups, such as Mexican-Americans, is
already underway.
From the description above it should be obvious that the
HapMap sampling does not draw from commensurate types of
groups. Among other things, the groups differ with respect to the
likely degree of shared ancestry within each one. They differ in
the extent to which members share a cultural affiliation or
language. Han people, for instance, may speak any one of several
languages, including Cantonese and Mandarin, languages which
are linguistically farther apart than Spanish and Italian. The initial
HapMap sampling was designed to study patterns of genetic
variation among people from three well-separated points on what
most scientists believe is a geographic gradient of human genetic
variation around the world. Secondarily, the sampling was done
by convenience--it reflects the availability of scientists who were
eager to participate and technically capable of conducting HapMap
research, the existence of governments or other parties willing to
fund the research, and the prior existence of samples for which
new consent could be obtained without undue burden on
participants or researchers.
When introduced to the HapMap Project, many people hear
Yoruba, Han, Japanese, and Utah Mormons and think Black,
Asian, and White. They say, "You are sampling three races."
Some ask, "Where are the Native Americans?" In early
discussions, project organizers and advisors suspected that we
would have to contend with people's inclinations to over-
generalize, for instance, to view one sample of a single tribal group
in Nigeria as representing an entire race of black people.
Nevertheless, the degree to which the HapMap sampling strategy
resonates with folk notions of race, and perhaps reinforces these
notions or enhances their salience and significance, has surprised
me. In a different world, the Project might have had the time and
resources to begin with samples from groups that did not fit neatly
into racial categories, such as people from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sri
Lanka, some group or groups from India, some group or groups
from Indonesia or the Philippians, several groups of Africans, and
groups of American Indians/Alaskan Natives.
An alternative sampling approach would, however, have
opened up different fronts for criticism. Sampling from groups
that do not fit neatly into racial categories could have left the
Project open to the charge that researchers were spending large
sums of money to create maps that might not be the most useful for
the greatest numbers of people in the world. Furthermore,
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sampling that included indigenous people, or people from smaller,
less-industrialized countries, could have been viewed as a
pernicious attempt to transfer biological resources from the have-
less to the have-mores, an attempt by the wealthier nations and
scientists to plunder from the less-wealthy.
Questions about sample descriptors are intimately tied to
sample collection. In community engagements associated with the
HapMap Project, investigators asked potential participants, "How
would you like to be described? Are there racial or ethnic
descriptors that researchers should use or avoid? What geographic
descriptors would be best? What additional information should be
included to describe you and the specimens derived from you?"
Sample descriptors are both an ethical and technical scientific
issue. Descriptors are pertinent to the meaning of any data
generated-who do the samples represent, what type of
representation does this sampling constitute, what generalizations
and conclusions can legitimately be drawn from the data generated
using these samples? The choice of descriptors may also influence
people's tendency to view the sampled groups in racial terms.
So, sampling by race is not what most HapMap Project
organizers thought they were doing, but that is how the Project is
often perceived. Some pundits wonder whether the HapMap will
find genetic categories that coincide with folk notions of race,
whether the Project will reinforce some people's mistaken belief
that there are separate, distinct, biological categories of humans.
Will the Project alter or disrupt personal identities? Will it change
prevailing, popular concepts of race? These questions can be
situated within a decade-long debate that continues to rage in the
biomedical sciences literature, about whether or how race should
be used as a variable. Numerous articles in major journals attempt
to elucidate the proper use of race in biomedical science and
medicine, or attempt to clarify the meaning of data in which race
was used as a variable.4 This scientific dispute is not primarily
4. See, e.g., Pilar Ossorio & T. Duster, Race and Genetics: Controversies
in Biomedical, Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences, American Psychologist,
May-June 2005, at 334; Michael Bamshad et al., Deconstructing the
Relationship between Genetics and Race, Nature Reviews Genetics, Aug. 2005,
at 598; Charmaine D. Royal & Georgia M. Dunston, Changing the Paradigm
from "Race" to Human Genome Variation, Nature Genetics Supplement, Oct.
26, 2004, at S5; Francis S. Collins, What We Do and Don't Know About
"Race, " "Ethnicity, " Genetics, and Health at the Dawn of the Genome Era,
Nature Genetics Supplement, Oct. 26, 2004, at S13; Ricardo V. Santos &
Marcos C. Maio, Race, Genomics, Identities and Politics in Contemporary
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about the quality or validity of the data; rather, it is about the
interpretation and meaning of the data. What kinds of knowledge
should or could existing data produce?
Unfortunately, the "race in science" question is often
formulated as a "binary trap," an argument framed so that each
disputant must take one of two mutually exclusive positions-that
race is always an important and useful variable when collecting
and analyzing data on humans, or that race is never a useful or
appropriate variable. People line up behind one of these
categorical positions and battle it out with opponents.
There are several important and unexamined assumptions
behind the race-in-science debate. Perhaps the most important
assumption is that the reality or existence of race can be
adjudicated using genetic data-we will find "The Answer" to
questions of whether human races exist by sampling more
populations and looking at more loci. A second assumption is that,
if we do not find an answer to the race question in genetic data,
then we should not be using race as a demographic variable in
biomedical research or health care. If race is not "genetically real"
then it has no meaning and no place in research or medicine. I
would like to challenge both of these assumptions.
Prior to discussing the assumptions, however, it is useful to ask
what most people, including most scientists, mean when they use
the term "race." Why would people think that we could find race
in our genes or in collections of haplotypes? There is a large body
of scholarship detailing people's different conceptions of race, and
the ways in which race is deployed to achieve certain goals in
Brazil, Critique of Anthropology, Mar. 2004, at 347; Rick A. Kitties & Kenneth
M. Weiss, Race, Ancestry, and Genes: Implications for Defining Disease Risk,
4 Ann. R. Genomics & Human Genetics 33 (2003); Esteban G. Burchard et al.,
The Importance of Race and Ethnic Background in Biomedical Research and
Clinical Practice, 348 New England J. Med. 1170 (2003); Susanne B. Haga & J.
Craig Venter, FDA Races in the Wrong Direction, Science, July 2003, at 466;
Neil Risch et al., Categorization of Humans in Biomedical Research: Genes,
Race and Disease, Genomebiology, July 2002, at 1; David B. Goldstein &
Lounes Chikhi, Human Migrations and Population Structure: What We Know
and Why It Matters, 3 Ann. R. Genomics & Human Genetics 129 (2002);
Reanne Frank, A Reconceptualization of the Role of Biology in Contributing to
Race/Ethnic Disparities in Health Outcomes, 20 Population Research & Pol'y
R. 441 (2001); Harold P. Freeman, The Meaning of Race in
Science-Considerations for Cancer Research, Cancer, Jan. 1998, at 219;
Richard S. Cooper & Jay S. Kaufman, Race and Hypertension: Science and
Nescience, Hypertension, Nov. 1998, at 817.
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society.5 In the U.S., we all grow up with folk notions of race,
according to which races are distinct categories of people. These
racial categories are treated as fixed and stable, retlective of
essential, intrinsic, pervasive properties of persons. Race-based
divisions in society are believed to reflect natural divisions. When
we perceive race, we are perceiving an asocial feature of reality.
Although attempts to define race or delineate racial groups
typically flounder on the shoals of over- or under-inclusivity, like
pornography, most people "know it when they see it." Part of the
reasoning behind the race-in-science debate is that if we view race
as an asocial quality of the world, of our biological selves, then we
should be able to measure, characterize, and delineate it by using
the proper scientific tools for studying human biology, the tools of
biomedical science.
Folk notions of race developed prior to modem molecular
genetics. Nonetheless, molecular genetics is easily incorporated
into these folk notions. If race is an intrinsic, immutable,
pervasive, and natural property of persons, then what is more
immutable, essential, and natural than his or her genome? What is
more likely to be a root cause of these perceived biological
differences than genes? The coalescing of beliefs about race with
beliefs about the power of genetic explanations is probably one
reason that issues of race are particularly prominent in debates
about genetics research. Another reason, of course, is that the field
of human genetics grew out of the pernicious field of eugenics.
6
Returning to the assumptions underlying the race-in-science
controversy, I will argue that the existence or nature of human
races is not something we can find or determine using genetic
5. See, e.g., Statement of the American Sociological Association on the
Importance of Collecting Data and Doing Social Scientific Research on Race,
American Sociological Association, available at http://www.asanet.org/
govemance/racestmt.html [hereinafter Statement]; America Becoming: Racial
Trends and Their Consequences, Vol. 1 (Neil Smelser et al. eds., 2001); Sandra
Lee et al., The Meanings of "Race'" in the New Genomics: Implications for
Health Disparities Research, 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y, L., & Ethics 33 (2001);
Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke L. J. 1487
(2000); Audrey Smedley, Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a
Worldview (2d ed. 1999); I. Henry Lopez, White by Law (1996) [hereinafter
Lopez, White by Law]; M. Omi & H. Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States (2d ed. 1994); I. Henry Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. R. 1
(1994) [hereinafter Lopez, The Social Construction].
6. See, e.g., Daniel Keveles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the
Uses of Human Heredity (1995).
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tools. We have not found and will not find race in our genomes or
as a genetic reality, particularly if what we mean by the commonly
used phrase "genetic reality" is that races consist of distinct genetic
categories of people. No clear or consistent pattern of genetic
variation or set of alleles separates humans into four or five groups
and only those groups; no major genetic discontinuities separate
people into races.
What have scientists discovered so far about human genetic
variation and racial groups? They have -discovered that we are a
very young species, far less genetically diverse than most other
species that have been studied.7  For example, humans are
approximately four times less genetically diverse than a single
species of chimpanzee.8 Modem human beings probably arose in
Africa, and a small subset of humans migrated out of Africa, in one
or more waves, approximately thirty to fifty thousand years ago.
9
Because we are a young species that expanded rapidly to populate
the earth, we have not had time to develop much genetic
heterogeneity. Nor has any human population experienced the
requisite degree of reproductive isolation to separate into a
genetically distinct sub-species.
Studies have not identified any "pure" races, and no genetic
variants are found in all people of one race but no people of
another.' 0 Approximately eighty-five percent of all human genetic
variation is found within any human population or group-the vast
majority of human genetic variation does not distinguish between
groups, even when the groups being compared are composed by
7. Collins, supra note 4; Bamshad et al., supra note 4; Kitties & Weiss,
supra note 4; Vence L. Bonham et al., Race and Ethnicity in the Genome Era:
The Complexity of the Constructs, American Psychologist, Jan. 2005, at 9; Lynn
B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification and "Race",
Nature Genetics Supplement, Nov. 2004, at S28; John H. Relethford, Genetics
of Modern Human Origins and Diversity, 27 Ann. R. Anthropology 1 (1998).
8. Kittles & Weiss, supra note 4; Anne Fischer et al., Evidence for a
Complex Demographic History of Chimpanzees, Molecular Biology and
Evoluation, Feb. 12, 2004, at 199.
9. Bonham et al., supra note 7; Relethford, supra note 7; Bamshad et al.,
supra note 4; Sarah A. Tishkoff & Scott M. Williams, Genetic Analysis of
African Populations: Human Evolution and Complex Disease, Nature Reviews
Genetics, Aug. 2002, at 611; Jonathan Marks, What It Means to Be 98%
Chimpanzee (2002); Steve Olson, Mapping Human History: Discovering the
Past Through Our Genes (2002).
10. Bonham et al., supra note 7.
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race." Seven to fifteen percent of the human enetic markers vary
between two groups from the same continent. Only four to five
percent of genetic variation occurs primarily between groups from
different continents. 13 This between-continent variation represents
a tiny fraction of our entire genomes (5% of 0.1%).
Geneticists can use statistical models that analyze data from
hundreds of genetic markers per person to cluster people according
to degrees of relatedness or shared ancestry. Recently, it has
become popular to cluster individuals according to their ancestors'
continents of origin. 14 Many people think of contemporary racial
groups as representing ancestral populations that resided for long
periods on different continents, and one could view the ability to
construct continental clusters as a finding of race in our genomes.
However, different and equally valid statistical manipulations of
the same data sets can produce clusters in which people from
different continents are grouped together, or can separate people
from one continent into different clusters. 15 There is nothing
intrinsically more important about statistically constructed genetic
groupings that map onto continents. That tiny bit of the genome
that varies between continents is not more important in
understanding human health and illness, human evolution, or
individual and collective identity, than that vastly greater portion
of the genetic variation that occurs between two individuals within
any group. Genetic differences between and among people do
exist, but this variation does not sort the species discretely and
unambiguously into a small number of biological categories
consistent with folk notions of race. There are many different
ways of finding genetic similarity and difference among
individuals and groups.
The weight of existing evidence makes it extremely unlikely
that additional findings will change our current understandings of
human genetic variation and human races, no matter how many
11. Bamshad et al., supra note 4; Kitties & Weiss, supra note 4; Noah A.
Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, Science, Dec. 20,
2002, at 2381.
12. Marks, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Rosenberg et al., supra note 11; Hua Tang et al., Genetic
Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in Case-Control
Association Studies, 76 Am. J. Human Genetics 268 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Rosenberg et al., supra note 11; Tang et al., supra note 14;
David Serre & Svante Paabo, Evidence for Gradients of Human Genetic
Diversity Within andAmong Continents, Genome Research, Nov. 2004, at 1679.
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more sequences or haplotyped genomes scientists generate. The
genetic data, like anthropological data from an earlier era, do not
support folk notions of races as discrete, fundamentally, and
pervasively different, natural groups of humans. Does this mean
that race is not real? No! Race is real even if it is not a genetic
construct. 16 Marriage, childhood, and public school are just a few
of the institutions, relations, or status positions that are real but not
genetically defined or genetically distinct entities. In considering
the primary assumption of the race-in-science debate, we must
consider the possibility that races exist and can be measured and
evaluated with the tools of history, sociology, law, geography, and
psychology, even if they cannot be delimited with the tools of
genetics.
If folk notions of race are not supported by genetic research,
then what is race? Contemporary race theorists are not unified in
their views of the meaning and nature of race, but most would
likely agree that race involves the mapping of meaning onto
people's physical and behavioral traits. 17 Relevant physical traits
include hair color and texture, eye shape and color, and of course,
skin color. In addition, racial meanings are attributed to ancestry,
language(s) spoken, accents, religion, nationality or national
origin, and political philosophies. Race is social and relational, we
create it through our interactions. Thus, it is fluid and contingent
on historical and geographical circumstances. A person may be
black in one census and white or "colored" in the next, may be
white on her birth certificate and black on her death certificate,
may be white in the Bahamas but black in the U.S.
Despite its fluid and contingent nature, race is one of the most
pervasive and deeply entrenched social stratifying practices in U.S.
society-as we create race, we create racial hierarchies and we
16.
Care should be taken, however, not to push this insight [that race is not
a set of biological categories but a social construct] to its
constructionist extreme and claim that race is merely a social
contrivance and therefore not "real"...... if things are defined as real,
they are real in their consequences. The concepts of race and ethnicity
are social realities because they are deeply rooted in the consciousness
of individuals and groups, and because they are firmly fixed in our
society's institutional life.
America Becoming, supra note 5, at 3.
17. See, e.g., Omi & Winnant, supra note 5; Statement, supra note 5;
Smedley, supra note 5; Lopez, The Social Construction, supra note 5; Ossorio
& Duster, supra note 4.
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instantiate these hierarchies in our institutions, our geography, and
perhaps, our biology.' 8 Through our practices, including scientific
and medical ones, we concretize and materialize racial ideologies.
Some racially-stratified features of U.S. society that may influence
health include: access to health care; access to health insurance;
residential segregation and the quality of housing; employment
opportunities; exposures to toxins; access to affordable, fresh,
nutritious food; and access to safe spaces for physical exercise.
Even if race is not genetic, many factors that correlate with race or
that come into existence as a function of race, can have impacts on
drug responses, on disease progression, and on immune system
functioning.
The discussion above helps explain why I believe that there are
legitimate reasons to use race as a variable in answering some
research questions or in making some medical decisions. Race
variables may generate data that point towards new medical
interventions or cures, or towards better understandings of the
causes of health problems. At times, race may be proxy for some
cause that we cannot yet measure or have not figured out that we
should measure. Race variables may also be useful in assessing
the effects of racism and institutional inequalities in access to
health care or other health-promoting goods in society. Finally,
race variables may capture aspects of a person's cumulative life
experience, effects that are difficult or impossible to disaggregate
into separate variables; the same could be true for gender and class
variables. Viewed this way, race could be understood as a
biological consequence, not a genetic cause. It is something that
may be measurable now, and have health effects, but it is neither
immutable nor essential. Race as a consequence or effect is not
genetic destiny; rather, it is a contingent result of living in a
racially stratified society.
Here, I want to emphasize that not all biological variation is
caused by genetic variation. Too often, commentators discuss
genetic variation and biological variation as though these are
interchangeable concepts; they are not. If we compare two
individuals or two groups of organisms, they might differ in a
biological characteristic such as height or disease state even if they
possess the same relevant alleles or genetic variants. Biological
variation has many causes, including differing diets, differing




exposures to toxins, and different access to health care to name just
a few. Genetics is only one of many determinants of biological
variation. Difficult as it is to believe in this geneticized era, genes
are probably the least important factor in creating the biological
variation that we describe as racial health disparities.
Returning to the race-in-science controversy, I would argue
that race may be a legitimate and useful variable in biomedical
research, even if folk notions of race are incorrect. On the other
hand, race will not always be the most useful or informative
taxonomy for answering biomedical research questions or for
guiding health care decisions. There may be better ways of
allocating people into groups, of lumping or splitting them when
we need to categorize to understand or intervene in a phenomenon.
Race ought not be used as a proxy for other, measurable variables.
Race ought not be used simply out of habit or convenience.
From its inception, the concept of race has involved social
stratification and social hierarchies-some racial groups have
always been viewed as more beautiful, more intelligent, more
civilized, more law-abiding, or perfected than others.' 9 After
reflecting on this legacy, some scholars object to any use of race in
science because they believe it is terribly difficult, if not
impossible, to disentangle racist beliefs from any use of racial
categories. 20 While the danger of inadvertently importing racist
assumptions is real, I disagree with the proposition that it should
entirely preclude the use of race in biomedical science. A better
approach is to use race in a far more educated, reflective, and
cautious manner. It would be difficult to make sense of, or even
describe, this very racialized society without resorting to some
concept of race.
Even when inter-racial comparisons are useful and legitimate,
nobody should forget that such comparisons reflect statistical,
mean differences between groups. They do not provide
information about the outcome for any particular individual. Dr.
Kidd emphasized this point during his presentation, but it cannot
19. See, Marks, supra note 9; Siep Stuurman, Francois Bernier and the
Invention of Racial Classification, 50 History Workshop J. 1 (2000); Tore
Fraengsmyr, Linnaeus, The Man and His Work (1983).
20. See, e.g., Nish Chaturvedi, Ethnicity as an Epidemiological
Determinant-Crudely Racist or Crucially Important?, 30 Int'l J. Epidemiology
925 (2001); Robert Schwartz, Racial Profiling in Medical Research, 344 New
England J. Med. 1392 (2001); Raj Bhopal, Is Research Into Ethnicity and




be repeated often enough. For most research observations, the
within-racial-group variation in treatment outcome (or other
dependant variable) is greater than the between-group variation.
Thus, even if the white-subject sample in a particular study
responds less-well, on average, to drug X than does the Asian-
subject sample, it is true that some white people will respond to
drug X better than some Asian people.
Unfortunately, both medical experts and non-medical members
of our society have a tendency to transform statistical claims into
categorical ones. Reports of a mean difference between racial or
ethnic groups in response to a drug become common knowledge,
and soon "we all know that black people do not respond to drug X"
or "Asians are particularly sensitive to drug Y." Such common
knowledge about racial, ethnic, or national groups is often wrong,
or at least misleading, and should always be viewed with
suspicion. Similarly, even when a particular gene variant or a
particular haplotype is reported as being more common than
average in people of one ethnic group, race, or nationality, this
does not mean that all people of that group have the reported
variant or haplotype.
Returning to a general discussion of the race-in-science
controversy, we should not view the use of race as an all or nothing
proposition. Rather than falling into the binary trap and then
chewing off our own--or each other's-legs to get out, we should
take a case-by-case approach and ask what work a racial taxonomy
is doing in any particular instance. Scientists and physicians
should justify their use of racial taxonomies. Likewise, colleagues
and critics should always examine the assumptions underlying
particular uses of race in science. In cases such as the HapMap
Project, scientists should take care not to generalize their
conclusions inappropriately. Scientists and others associated with
the Project should note the error of imagining that a few hundred
people could ever represent the genetic diversity of the millions or
hundreds of millions of people included in each of the four or five
races.
One contributor to unreflective uses of race variables in
biomedical research is the federal law and guidance that requires
many federally-funded studies to be designed using the Office of
Management and Budget's ("OMB's") categories for race and
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ethnicity.2 1 In some cases, the law requires researchers to search
for and report inter-racial and inter-ethnic differences. We find
racial differences because we construct our research to look for
them, and in finding them we reinforce our beliefs that people of
different racial groups are naturally and inevitably different from
each other. We almost never design experiments that could
elucidate the causes of these differences, 23 perhaps because the
causes are presumed to be genetic. The law and guidance
documents mandating the search for racial and ethnic differences
were undoubtedly well-motivated, but they may cause the
scientific community to focus on race and racial differences to the
exclusion of other factors that have greater power to explain health
and medical outcomes.
The ethical questions raised by the use of race variables must
be considered early and often in designing any biomedical research
project. There are many concerns about justice that should receive
heightened attention in the context of a large-scale government
effort such as the HapMap Project. Dr. Clayton introduced some
of these ethical concerns in her presentation. Ethical concerns may
be dismissed with comments such as, "Oh, you are talking about
potential harms, but they are distant and unlikely to eventuate," or
"The harm is speculative-it has never happened before." Those
statements are incorrect when applied to the use of racial
categories in research and medicine. The U.S. has a reprehensible
history of biomedical research on human participants in which
people of color have been abused; these abuses were sometimes
incorporated directly into the research design.24 The U.S. has ahistory of using racist science to justify discriminatory law and
21. National Institutes of Health Revitilization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-43, 107 Stat. 122; Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as
Subjects in Clinical Research, 5 C.F.R. § 315 (1993). See also, FDA Guidance
on Demographic Subgroup Reporting, 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2005).
22. National Institutes of Health Revitilization Act of 1993; 5 C.F.R. § 315
(1993).
23. Cooper & Kaufman, supra note 4.
24. See, Patricia King, Race, Justice, and Research, in Beyond Consent:
Seeking Justice in Research 88-110 (J.P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998); Dorothy
Roberts, The Nature Of Blacks'Skepticism About Genetic Testing, 27 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 971 (1997); David Richardson, Ethics in Gynecologic Surgical
Innovation, 170 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 1 (1994); Todd Savitt, The
Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and Demonstration in the Old South,
48 J. Southern History 331 (1982); Alan Brandt, Racism and Research: The




policies. 25 This legacy should encourage particular vigilance by
scientists and by those who regulate and oversee research.
Patricia King, a law professor at Georgetown and one of my
heroes, has used the phrase "the dilemma of difference ' 26 in
pointing out that we must negotiate a treacherous terrain when
conducting science, or regulating it, with the intention of
improving the lives of people of color. On the one hand, our
biomedical research may need to take race and ethnicity into
account if it aims to identify and diminish racial and ethnic health
disparities. On the other hand, simply finding and studying
differences can reinforce those norms and institutions that create
health disparities in the first place. The study of racial differences
must be undertaken with the utmost thought and care, or we chance
reinforcing antiquated racist notions and, in the end, we may repeat
history by building scientific support for discriminatory policies,
we may exacerbate unjust inequalities.
Some people fear that the HapMap Project, and other studies of
human genetic variation, will produce data that will be used to
support unjust policies. The Project could have pernicious effects
merely by studying genetic variation in human subject groups that
evoke racial categories, regardless of the data generated. In my
opinion, the chances of perpetuating racial injustice increase if
biomedical researchers cannot communicate the complexities of
human genetic variation, and if they lack sophisticated theories of
race to guide them in project design and analysis. I am confident
that, in the long run, the study of human genetic variation will
reveal the rich tapestry of within-race variation--data that can
undermine simple, geneticized folk notions of race. I am also
confident that the many non-genetic sources of health and illness
will someday receive a much larger share of scientific attention, a
development that would decouple simple, genetic notions of race
from views about health disparities and policies to improve health.
I am less confident that we will avoid harm, or produce benefit, in
the short run.
25. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (1981); Smedley,
supra note 5.
26. King, supra note 24.
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